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ROBERT ADAMS AND THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD 
Mark L. Thomas 
Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good 
moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. 
He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating 
less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit consid-
erations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give 
three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and gracious-
ness of God toward creation. I conclude that grace would not release a per-
fect agent from responsibility to create the best. 
In "Must God Create the Best?" Robert Merrihew Adams argues for 
the denial of the following claim: 
(P)If a perfectly good moral agent created any world at all, it 
would have to be the very best world that he could create.' 
Adams' intent is to establish that God could create a world less good 
than the best one possible without sacrificing his perfect goodness. The 
first main section of his argument responds to potentially forceful objec-
tions-based on deontological moral considerations- to creation of less 
than the best. Adams considers in the second section of his argument 
the possibility that God would exhibit a character flaw in creating a 
world less good than the best one possible even if, in creating such a 
world, he refrained from wronging anyone and showed perfect kind-
ness to everyone. It is on this second part of Adams' argument that this 
paper will focus. 
Adams' strategy is to argue that God would manifest a virtue rather 
than a vice in creating less than the besU He posits the Judeo-Christian 
virtue of grace which he defines as the disposition to love independent 
of considerations of the merit of the beloved. Adams' argument does 
not rest on just this notion of grace, however. Central to his argument is 
the claim that God acts graciously in creating a world.' Adams uses the 
phrase "graciousness in creation,"4 and by this term he seems to mean 
that the act of creating a group of creatures is an act of love toward them 
without regard to their merits. God's creation of a possible world is a 
gracious act. 
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Adams succinctly states his argument by claiming the following 
inconsistency between grace and merit: 
... (i)that grace, as a disposition to love that is not dependent on 
the merit of the beloved, is one of the best virtues, and 
(ii) that a creator's choosing to create and love less excellent 
creatures than he could have chosen must necessarilv manifest 
some imperfection in the creator's character. ~ 
For (ij) can hardly be asserted except on the basis of the assumption 
(iii)that it would be an imperfection to choose objects to be creat-
ed and loved on any basis other than merit; 
and (iii) is a denial of (0." 
Without here reconstructing his argument, I take Adams' central point 
to be that, if God has the perfection of being gracious in creation, then he 
cannot be faulted for creating a world less good than the best one possi-
ble, for claiming such a fault needs an additibnal claim that the merit of a 
possible world must be the basis for creation of it. Such concern with 
merit is incompatible with the motivation of grace according to Adams. 
Even though I agree that grace is a critical divine virtue, in the follow-
ing sections I shall mount two sets of arguments against Adams' claim 
that, because of his graciousness, God need not create the best. The first 
two arguments challenge Adams' particular use of grace with regard to 
creation. The second set of arguments works against Adams even if one 
accepts his characterization of creation at the global level as gracious. 
Grace for creatures versus grace for a world 
Premise (ii) of Adams' argument above is ambiguous. The statement 
refers to the creation of less excellent creatures than are possible; however, 
the point of contention is whether a creator's choosing to create a less excel-
lent world than he could have chosen would necessarily exhibit a character 
flaw. Adams may very well be using "creatures" as a shorthand reference 
to a world, but "less excellent creatures" could also refer to creatures con-
sidered as to their merit as individuals. Regardless of Adams' intended 
meaning, this ambiguity provides a cue for a relevant distinction. 
There are different levels to be considered in creation of a complex whole, 
and therefore God's relations to each of these levels may be substantially dif-
ferent. God would create individual creatures taken as individuals. Further, 
relations between these things are possible, so there would be various sets of 
these individuals. Finally, God would be creating a whole world taken in 
the highest global sense, including all individuals, subsets, and their rela-
tions. The act of creation, then, has at least two important senses: creation of 
a world as a whole and creation of individual creatures as individuals. 
In conjunction with this distinction, I offer two observations concern-
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ing creation. The first is that it is possible that the best possible world 
would not be simply a collection of the best possible creatures consid-
ered individually. The second is that grace seems most relevantly oper-
ative in the relation between God and creatures as individuals. There is 
therefore room for God to choose a possible world on the global level in 
terms of merit while choosing some creatures considered individually 
on terms other than merit, namely by motivation of grace. 
One might object that, if God selects a world on the basis of merit, 
then he would also be selecting the individual creatures which compose 
that world on the basis of merit, because the merit of a possible world is 
determined by the parts and their relations. One might further argue 
that, even if God does not select the best possible creatures, he neverthe-
less selects them on the basis of their merit with regard to the world as a 
whole. However, it is possible that, given the complexity of the best 
possible world, there could be some variance among some of the possi-
ble creatures selected while still preserving the value of the world on the 
global level. It is possible that two possible worlds could tie as best in 
terms of global merit. Possible world 1 would involve creature A and 
creature B and their relations, while possible world 2 would involve 
creature C and creature D and their relations (but neither would include 
both sets), and each combination would contribute equally to the global 
merit of the best world. God might therefore choose one duo on the 
basis of grace in Adams' sense, even though on the global level God 
would be creating the best possible world with a focus on merit. 
Therefore, it is unclear that there is necessarily a strict incompatibility 
between the standards of grace and merit in God's act of creation. 
Is "gracious creation" coherent? 
Again, the claim that God acts graciously in creating is crucial to 
Adams' argument. If, for example, one were to claim that God acts lov-
ingly and graciously only after creation occurs, and not in the act of cre-
ation itself, then the virtue of grace would be fully compatible with 
merit-based considerations of which world to create. More specifically, 
the claim (i0 in Adams' argument would be revised to: 
(ii caA)that a creator's choosing to create less excellent creatures [a 
less excellent world] than he could have chosen must necessarily 
manifest some imperfection in the creator's character. 
And (ii ca) would then be based on: 
(iii ca7)that it would be an imperfection to choose objects to be 
created on any basis other than merit. 
Once "love" is removed from the statements, (iii ca) is not obviously a 
denial of (0, and, therefore, (ii ca) is consistent with (i). So, if the act of 
creation precedes God's acts of grace, then Adams' argument against the 
principle (P), that God must create the best, fails. 
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I shall present an argument for the claim that "graciousness in creation" 
lacks coherence (though, due to objections which can be made, I do not 
claim that this argument is conclusive). First, Adams argues against claims 
that God has wronged or acted unkindly toward merely possible beings; 
such claims lack substance. Adams says, "The moral community consists 
of actual beings .... A merely possible being cannot be (actually) wronged or 
treated unkindly."s By the same token, neither can merely possible beings 
be treated benevolently or have their situation improved from a moral 
point of view; consistency requires this extension of Adams' argument.9 
Furthermore, an important component of grace is that it involves loving 
acts, and loving acts inherently benefit creatures. Loving acts are inherent-
ly kind acts rather than unkind or neutral acts. So one cannot act gracious-
ly toward possible creatures; therefore, "gracious creation" seems incoher-
ent just as is the notion of wronging a possible creature.!O 
The comparative neutrality of grace 
The following three objections affect Adams' argument even if the notion 
of gracious creation remains intact. Initially, I want to establish what I call 
the comparative neutrality of grace. Grace could be a reason for choosing to 
create a possible world. If God is gracious, and if the creation of a group of 
creatures is a loving act, then God's virtue of grace provides a reason for the 
creation of a world. God would simply be expressing his love in a magnifi-
cent and powerful way. However, grace, as Adams defines it,ll cannot be a 
reason for the creation of one world rather than another, and this situation 
faces God prior to his creation of a world. God has a whole range of possi-
ble worlds from which to choose: the best, the worst, and those in-between. 
Again, grace is love without any regard for the merit of the beloved. So 
God could love anyone world just as much as another.12 Grace is neither a 
preference for perfection nor for imperfection; in fact, it contains no merit-
based preference at all according to Adams. Grace is equally capable of 
expression through the creation of any possible world. 
The virtue of grace is neutral, then, to anyone world compared to 
another; therefore, I call this attribute the comparative neutrality of 
grace. God's moral perfection is a factor in the creation of a world, and 
grace is a central element of God's perfection. The creation of any possi-
ble world would be consistent with the grace element of God's perfect 
goodness. Not only could God create the best, and not only could he 
create some world where all creatures are very happy, but he also could 
exhibit grace through loving any world whatsoever (just as he might 
desire to create or love any world whatsoever). 
Since grace is neutral in this way, one of the following must be the case: 
either there is another reason besides grace for the creation of a particular 
world or God acts arbitrarily in choosing a possible world for creation. 
Reductio ad absurdum 
A more forceful, though simple, argument can be developed from the 
preceding remarks. If all choices of a possible world are equally capable 
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of being an expression of grace, then, just as God can create graciously a 
world somewhat less good than the best possible, so too God can create 
the worst possible world graciously. God can manifest his virtue (of 
grace) and therefore his goodness13 by creating the world with the most 
cruelty and suffering possible. Unless God is morally irrational, he will 
base his choice of a possible world on something besides grace alone. 
The grace-plus argument 
Since, as I have argued, grace is neutral in a comparison of one possi-
ble world to another, grace must not be the only component of God's 
choice of a world if he is to act rationally." Further, consideration of 
merit cannot provide any part of the basis of God's choice of a world if 
the option of a world less good than the best possible is to be preserved. 
Even the tiniest consideration of merit in creation would tip the moral 
scale toward the best possible world, since it contains the most merit. 
Adams' argument is actually ambiguous at this point, although given 
his conclusion he must have intended to eliminate merit considerations 
altogether. The claim (iii) can be interpreted either as 
(iii m15)that it would be an imperfection to choose objects to be 
created and loved on any basis other than one containing merit 
or as 
(iii ma16)that it would be an imperfection to choose objects to be 
created and loved on any basis other than merit alone. 
Statement (0 has a similar ambiguity. It may mean either 
(i g17)that grace, as a disposition to love that is not mostly depen-
dent on the merit of the beloved, is one of the best virtues 
or 
(i ga1H)that grace, as a disposition to love that is not dependent 
on the merit of the beloved at all, is one of the best virtues. 19 
The difference between (iii m) and (iii ma) involves the degree to which 
merit must permeate the basis for God's perfect actions. The claim that 
merit must be considered or else an action is imperfect is weaker than 
the claim that if anything but merit is considered an action is imperfect. 
The difference between (i g) and (i ga) is likewise one of weaker and 
stronger versions of grace. Obviously, the stronger version of grace is 
conducive to Adams' conclusion. A separate issue which may involve 
an implicit assumption of Adams is whether or not grace wholly perme-
ates the basis of an act of Cod. 
Claim (iii ma), then, is inconsistent with both (i g) and (i ga). Claim 
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(iii m), however, is consistent with (i g). Therefore, if the two interpreta-
tions, (iii m) and (i g), can be justified, then Adams' conclusion is 
blocked. If grace can be defined with room for even the smallest amount 
of merit-consideration, then God could act with grace plus merit in cre-
ating a world. Again, I have argued that, based on the neutrality of 
grace, if merit were considered in even the smallest amount the best pos-
sible world would be chosen. Claim (iii m) could be held without entail-
ing that God could not act graciously in creating a world. 
Furthermore, claim (iii m) may also be consistent with (i ga), depend-
ing on one's assumptions about the complexity of actions and the perme-
ation of those actions by grace (if grace is a basis for one's actions). If 
God's action is sufficiently complex to allow both grace and merit-con-
sideration to form its basis, then (iii m) would be compatible with both (i 
g) and (i ga). If 1 % of a decision is based on considerations of merit while 
99% of the decision is based on grace, it is plausible to call the ensuing 
action gracious. And, again, if even the smallest amount of merit were 
considered in the creation of a world, then the world chosen would nec-
essarily be the best one possible, due to the neutrality of grace. 
Virtue plus 
This discussion can be broadened. Adams wants to ignore utilitarian 
considerations in the discussion of which world(s) God should create.20 
However, total exclusion of teleological considerations from moral dis-
cussion seems extreme.21 It seems that if a virtue were to lead one equal-
ly to two actions, but if the second of those actions were also recom-
mended by teleological considerations, then the second action should be 
chosen over the first. Virtue-plus is a better justification than virtue 
alone. And if a perfectly good God can graciously create two worlds, 
but if the second world would contain the best consequences, then from 
a holistic moral perspective God should choose the second world, which 
would be the best one possible. 
Concluding remarks 
I have attempted to elucidate difficulties which would result if God 
were to act only on grace in creating a world, and I have therefore been 
arguing that more than just grace should provide the basis for God's 
decision. If merit-based considerations are included in the basis, then 
the best possible world would be chosen. However, Adams might reject 
such considerations as wholly incompatible with grace as he under-
stands it. 
Still, I have given arguments for compatibility between merit-consid-
erations and grace. Merit and grace may be congruous along the distinc-
tion between the global and individual levels of creation. Further, a 
temporal demarcation between creation and post-creation graciousness 
would also mediate the conflict. Finally, there may be space for compat-
ibility between merit and grace even regarding creation considered as a 
single act of God (with a complex basis), if one takes the merit stipula-
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tion in sense (iii m). Even adopting Adams' notion of grace, it may be 
possible for God to choose to create some creatures (most likely, some 
set of rational creatures) on the basis of grace while choosing to create 
the world as a whole because it is the best one possible. 
Much of the force of an argument like Adams' is in its applicability to 
the presence of evil in our actual world. One simply struggles with the 
claim that this world is the best God could create, and if its being created 
graciously could release God from charges of wrongdoing one could at 
least continue to affirm God's perfect goodness. I have serious doubts, 
however, that grace would release God from culpability in creating less 
than the best.22 
Rice University 
NOTES 
1. Robert M. Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" in The Virtue of Faith 
and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p.51. 
2. One might raise a question about the structure of this part of Adams' 
argument. One might question whether the claim that "action X manifests a 
virtue" entails the further claim that "action X cannot manifest a vice." 
Adams is arguing against that latter sort of claim regarding the action of cre-
ating less than the best possible world. More would need to be said about 
the compatibility of virtues and vices. 
3. One might question whether the religious tradition supports Adams' 
use of the notion of gracious creation of a world. Adams does seem to mis-
interpret the scripture (Psalm 8: 3-6) he presents (p.57) as support for his 
argument concerning grace and the rejection of (P). The deprecation of 
humanity in the scripture Adams quotes is not a contrast between possible 
human beings in various possible worlds. Rather, the contrast is between 
humanity and the other works of God or even between humanity and 
God-in the actual world. The scripture is neutral to the issue of whether or 
not this world is the best possible or even whether or not we are the best 
human beings possible. 
4. Adams, pp.56-57. 
5. Adams, note 6, p.63. 
6. The mnemonic here is ii [c]reation [a]lone, or (ii ca). 
7. iii [c]reation [a)lone. 
8. Adams, p.53. 
9. One might object that consistency further requires that merely possi-
ble beings cannot be assessed in terms of merit. However, I do not think 
this conclusion follows from Adams' assertion that the moral community 
consists of only actual beings. What is essential to membership in the moral 
community in Adams' sense is moral action which either harms or benefits 
another; merely possible creatures are unable to receive such real harms or 
benefits. However, God could certainly assess the merits such possible crea-
tures would have were they to exist (through his omniscience, for example). 
Such assessment of merit would have to be considered a morally neutral act 
with regard to the possible creature (the assessment could not harm or bene-
fit the possible beings). 
10. Adams might respond in either of two ways, and at least one of the 
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responses seems reasonably forceful. He might counter by saying that an 
act can be gracious without any creature necessarily receiving benefit. 
Perhaps the substance of God's grace comes from his disposition toward 
creatures whether possible or actual, so the act of creation could be gracious 
without necessarily benefiting any creature. Such a response has some plau-
sibility, for one might act with particular intended consequences, yet those 
consequences might be kept from fruition by external interference. For 
example, a certain academic might graciously bequeath her estate to a uni-
versity, yet a diabolical fiend-perhaps a disgruntled graduate student-
might nevertheless poison her, alter the will, and escape with the inheri-
tance. However, an omnipotent deity cannot be so easily released from 
responsibility due to external factors. In the initial act of creation, an 
omnipotent creator's actions must be efficacious. 
On the other hand, Adams might claim that the actual creatures, after cre-
ation, receive the benefit of the gracious creation, rather than the possible 
creatures. Such a suggestion is surely plausible. A beneficent act might 
improve the situation of the beneficiary only after the action occurs; for 
example, the aforementioned academic might benevolently and anony-
mously establish a trust fund for another; further, the trust fund might be 
established for one before she is born, while she remains a possible creature. 
So it is possible that the benefit of gracious creation only affects actual crea-
tures. 
11. Adams, p.56. 
12. I am setting aside the issue of whether worse creatures require a 
comparatively greater expenditure of grace by God; such a principle may 
lead to the conclusion that a God acting on grace in creation should create a 
very bad world-perhaps the worst world-in order to bestow the most 
love. 
13. Admittedly, the relation between the virtue of grace and God's over-
all goodness is left unprobed. On this relation, I interpret the strategy of the 
second section of Adams' paper to be to argue that part of God's perfect 
goodness is the virtue of grace, which entails that God need not create the 
best possible world. However, I do think there is room for compatibility 
between grace and merit-concern as components of God's goodness. 
14. If God's grace were merely triggered by a certain group of creatures 
in the way human love for an individual often seems to be, then one might 
argue that creation by grace alone is as rational as is marriage based on love 
alone. However, it is dubious that on the human level one's love is (or 
should be) ever wholly independent of evaluative or merit-based considera-
tions. 
15. iii [mlerit. 
16. iii [mlerit [anone. 
17. i [glrace. 
18. i [glrace [a]lone. 
19. A separate problem is whether grace is completely compatible with 
the other virtues which a perfectly good God should have. 
20. Adams, p.52. 
21. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p.30. 
22. I am grateful to Mark Kulstad, George Sher, Keith DeRose, and 
Michael Beaty for helpful comments on various drafts of this paper. 
